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Summary 
 
 Wage-setting institutions in several Asian and Latin American economies are compared 
and contrasted. The Asian economies have relied more on market wage determination, whereas 
the Latin American economies have encouraged institutions which push wages in key sectors up 
above market-clearing levels. Market wage determination, combined with export-led growth, has 
resulted in rapidly rising real wages in the context of full employment in the Asian economies. 
The Latin American economies have done less well. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 Most development analysts have paid little attention to the role of wage-setting 
institutions in determining the rate and character of economic growth. This omission is 
unfortunate for several reasons. First, a country’s wage-setting institutions may play a pivotal 
role in facilitating or impeding economic growth; rapid growth has been made possible by 
market wage determination in the successful Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) of East 
Asia. Second, some kinds of rapid economic growth have led to equally rapid improvements in 
wages and employment opportunities; this has occurred when economic growth has been of a 
labor-intensive, export-led character. Third, inherent in the very process of successful labor-
intensive, export-led growth is a tendency for comparative advantage to shift; once full 
employment is attained, the competition among employers for scarce labor bids up wages and 
induces a shift away from unskilled- labor-intensive products. 
 Labor market institutions differ greatly among the various regions of the developing 
world. In this paper, we contrast wage-setting institutions in the East Asian NICs (Hong Kong, 
Korea,1 Singapore, and Taiwan) with those of three countries in the Caribbean Basin (Costa 
Rica, Panama, and Jamaica). An overview of these differences appears in Section 2. Section 3 
describes the key features of wage-setting institutions in the three Caribbean Basin economies, 
while Section 4 examines wage-setting institutions in the East Asian NICs. Section 5 explores 
the relationship between wages and economic growth. Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Contrasting Wage-Setting Institutions in Different Regions 
 
 Different wage policies are pursued in various regions of the developing world. The 
single most important issue is whether a country relies primarily on market wage determination 
or institutional wage determination. 
 In most of the countries of Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, and South Asia, wages 
in key sectors are not determined by supply and demand, but rather by any or all of a number of 
nonmarket forces. These nonmarket forces often have potent influences in key sectors of those 
countries’ labor markets. Minimum wage laws are common in many developing countries, at 
least in certain major sectors (e.g., large factories). When these laws are enforced, wages may be 
very much higher in the affected sectors than they might otherwise have been in the absence of 
minimum wage laws. Labor unions often are very strong, and are able to use their strength at the 
bargaining table to secure above-market wages for their members. Pay policy with respect to 
public sector employees frequently results in higher wages being paid to government workers 
than to comparable workers in the private sector. Multinational corporations sometimes are 
encouraged to pay high wages to local workers, lest those corporations be expelled from the 
country if they do not. Finally, labor codes and protective labor legislation may add 
substantially to the costs employers must pay when they hire workers. For these reasons, models 
with wage dualism, unemployment, and other such features are often used to describe these 
countries’ labor markets (Harris and Todaro, 1970; Tidrick, 1975; Squire, 1981; Fields, 
forthcoming). 
 The newly industrializing countries of East Asia are different. Wages and other labor 
costs have not been inflated artificially there. Economic development in those economies has 
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depended on low labor costs. Policy makers in Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan 
realized that if they were to gain and then maintain trade positions in world markets, the basis for 
doing so would be low price, which implied in turn the need for low wages. Their wage policies 
consequently prevented wages from exceeding market levels, as was true in other parts of the 
world. For the most part, wage levels in the East Asian NICs were left to be determined by 
supply and demand. 
 Market wage determination, prevalent in the economies of East Asia during most of their 
recent histories, has had several fundamentally important implications for the success of export-
led growth in these economies. For one thing, market wage determination helped those countries 
avoid economic inefficiencies and misallocations of labor which might have arisen from 
distortions in wages. Market wage determination also naturally led employers to utilize the 
available labor force to the fullest extent possible, enabling those economies to pursue their 
inherent comparative advantages and produce goods intensive in labor. Another benefit of 
market wage determination is that it prevents substitution of capital in place of labor in the 
production process which, if it takes place, lessens employment. Yet another possible effect is 
that market wage determination diminishes the expected- income incentive in rural-urban 
migration; as shown in Fields (1984), the wage differential between manufacturing and 
agriculture is quite narrow in East Asia, much in contrast to most Latin American countries. 
Finally, market wage determination avoids unnecessarily high costs of production that might 
hamper a country’s ability to sell its products profitably in world markets. 
 Besides the direct effects described above, market wage determination also has effects on 
other factors often emphasized in the development literature. For instance, price stability requires 
absence of wage push. Then too, attraction of foreign investment requires reasonable labor cost 
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and industrial peace. Wage institutions are one element among many determinants of 
development performance, but they merit more attention than is usually given them. 
 It is important to note that while the East Asian economies did not permit wages to be set 
well above market-clearing levels, it is also true that for the most part they did not hold wages 
artificially below market-clearing levels either. But in Singapore in the 1970s and apparently in 
Korea more recently, wage repression was practiced. This point is dealt with further below. 
 The balance of this paper compares wage-setting institutions in select countries. 
 
3. Wage-Setting Institutions in Costa Rica, Panama, and Jamaica 
 
 Many countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have powerful wage-setting 
institutions. The general situation in Latin America and the Caribbean is that public policy 
encourages institutional forces which push the wages of certain groups of workers (but not 
others) above market levels.2 
 To illustrate in more detail, we present here the situation in three countries, each of which 
has an important wage institution which causes wages of certain workers to deviate from market 
levels. 
 
(a) Costa Rica 
 
 In general, a great deal of competition prevails within the private sector labor market in 
Costa Rica. Wages are set largely in accordance with supply and demand. When economic 
conditions have been favorable, real wages have risen and job composition has improved; but 
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when Costa Rica suffered a severe economic crisis in the early 1980s, falling labor earnings led 
the decline (Fields, 1988). 
 Turning now to institutional forces, unions are present, but they cover only a small 
fraction of the private sector labor force. Even where unions exist, they do not raise wages much 
above the levels prevailing in the nonunionized sectors of their economies.3 Costa Rica also has 
minimum wages. The authorities seek to keep the minimum wage growing in line with 
productivity but not faster (Gregory, 1981; Naranjo, 1985; Pollack, 1985). Starr (1981, p. 50) 
reports that minimum wages have less of an effect on actual wages paid in Costa Rica than in 
other Latin American countries. We may thus conclude that neither union wage-setting nor 
minimum wages has an important influence on market wage levels in Costa Rica. 
 The most important nonmarket force influencing wages in Costa Rica is public sector 
labor market policy.4 Wages in the public sector are about twice as high as those in the private 
sector. These differentials remain even after standardizing for differences in the levels of 
education and experience of workers in the two sectors (Uthoff and Pollack, 1985; Gindling, 
1986). Because of the higher pay in the public sector, private sector workers throughout Costa 
Rica aspire to public sector jobs. In response to the pressure for government jobs both from 
private sector workers and from the unemployed, the government has expanded public sector 
employment (MIDE- PLAN, 1984, p. 23). This has led to labor shortages in the private sector in 
certain occupations, especially those requiring the highest amounts of education. The growth of 
public sector employment at above-market wage rates has diverted funds from other uses and is 
not obviously the best use of those resources. Serious thought should be given to two aspects of 
policy concerning public sector labor markets in Costa Rica: whether to freeze the amount of 
total employment in that sector, as was agreed upon but apparently not effectuated; and whether 
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to gradually bring public sector wage levels more into line with those in the private sector. Given 
the need for austerity in Costa Rica, these possibilities may soon become realities. 
 Another policy issue is the financing of social security.5 Costa Rica’s social security 
system is among the most advanced in the developing world. It provides public assistance in the 
areas of health, food, and nutrition; housing; training; and income security for the young, the 
family, and the elderly. The National Planning Ministry estimates that the amount spent on social 
security is equivalent to 10% of the central government’s budget (MIDEPLAN, 1984, p. 16). 
These large expenditures are financed by a payroll tax, which amounts to 9.25% of payroll for 
employers and 5.5% of payroll for employees; as a percentage of disposable income, the taxes 
constitute considerably larger percentages than these. Payroll taxes generate disincentives to 
employment of labor and encourage the substitution of labor-saving technology. The policy 
question here is whether the payroll tax should continue to be relied upon to finance social 
security in Costa Rica, or whether income taxes and other sources that do not militate against 
employment should be used instead. 
 
(b) Panama 
 
 In Panama, the most important institutional influence on the labor market is that 
country’s labor code. Comprehensive studies of Panama’s labor code have been conducted by 
Butelman and Videla (1985) and Spinanger (1985), from which the following description is 
drawn. 
 The labor code is an ambitious undertaking, aimed at regulating wages and other labor 
market conditions throughout the Panamanian economy. 
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 Among the areas covered are: 
(i) Policies directly influencing pay levels: legal minimum wages, contract minimum wages 
and collectively bargained wage increases. 
(ii) Measures directed toward job rights: employment security, antidiscrimination legislation. 
(iii) Actions aimed at job environment: work rules, job/occupational training. 
(iv) Social legislation: maternity leave, paid sick leave, unemployment compensation. 
(v) Policies affecting the economic environment: collective bargaining framework, 
bureaucratic and legal regulations. 
Not only are these provisions on the books but they are enforced vigorously. Consequently, they 
have a very considerable bearing on the functioning of labor markets. 
 Panamanian employers report that the labor code provisions that have the greatest 
influence on them are: 
 (i) Hiring and firing aspects: Workers in Panama essentially have job security after two 
years. Employers are not free to dismiss workers after that time. Dismissal of a worker who has 
been in service a long time requires severance pay amounting to several years’ wages. A 
dismissal determined to be unjust carries a 50% penalty beyond that. Employers therefore are 
understandably reluctant to dismiss workers for any reason, justified or otherwise. 
 (ii) Regulations regarding unions: The labor code specifies rules for collective bargaining 
and provides that no collective bargaining agreement can worsen conditions already existing. 
This limits the ability of wages to respond to adverse changes in product market conditions, 
whether in individual markets or for the economy generally if macroeconomic conditions cause 
the economy to turn downward. With devaluation not an option (the Panamanian Balboa is 
always worth one US dollar), much of the adjustment in this latter case would occur in the form 
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of unemployment, e.g., by firms not filling vacancies. Presumably wage rigidity in unionized 
sectors also spills over into some nonunionized sectors. 
 (iii) Wage costs: Labor costs are raised by the labor code’s provisions regarding social 
security benefits including unemployment insurance, paid vacations and holidays, paid sick days, 
and a 13th month bonus. Butelman and Videla (1985) estimate that because of these provisions, 
a wedge of 45% is driven between the market wage and the perceived cost of employment. 
Panama’s labor code reduces the flexibility of the labor market and adds to labor costs. 
Spinanger (1985, p. 49) estimates that labor costs are 90% higher under the labor code than they 
would be in its absence. He concludes “Panama is suffering, to a large extent, from classical 
unemployment. . . These policies have increasingly come into conflict with the need — or rather 
the necessity — for flexibility in the labor market. It would be quite correct to state that many of 
the unemployed were just priced out of the market.”6 
 
(c) Jamaica 
 
 Wage differentials for comparable labor are a prominent feature of the Jamaican labor 
market. Trying to explain the conjunction of high unemployment and rising real wages in the 
mining and manufacturing sectors, Tidrick writes as follows: 
None of these puzzling features of Jamaican wage and employment patterns can be fully 
understood without reference to the distorted wage structure, that is, a wage structure in 
which workers of the same skill level receive different wages in different industries. The 
Jamaican wage structure is clearly distorted by this definition. Disparities among major 
sectors are dramatic. Unskilled bauxite mining workers earn about twice as much per 
week as unskilled workers in transportation or construction, the two next most highly 
paid industries. (In fact, unskilled mining workers earn more than skilled construction 
workers.) Unskilled construction workers, in turn, earn almost two and one-half times as 
much as agricultural workers. [Emphasis added]7 
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These observations led him to construct a model of a “wage-gap economy,” similar in many 
respects to the labor market characterization of Harris and Todaro (1970). 
 The single most important factor responsible for the wage gap in Jamaica is trade unions. 
Jamaica has two major political parties, each of which maintains close links with a major trade 
union federation. In exchange for the unions’ political support, whichever political party is in 
power has endeavored to strengthen the unions’ hands. In consequence, unions receive 
government encouragement of collective bargaining and through legislative action. But of 
course, the Jamaican economy is not advanced enough to provide jobs at such high wages for all. 
Those who are not able to find such jobs either end up unemployed searching for high-wage 
jobs, or underemployed in lower-paying jobs in agriculture or elsewhere. 
 Another institutional factor responsible for pushing wages above market levels for certain 
groups of workers in Jamaica is the existence of enclave industries. In bauxite mining, for 
example, production is very capital-intensive and energy-intensive, but few workers are needed. 
Hence, labor cost is a very minor part of total cost. Because of this, the mining companies are 
able to pay relatively high wages to local workers with only a small addition to total costs. 
 These two institutional factors — strong unions and the enclave economy — are not 
independent. Speaking of the mining industry, Chernick writes: 
. . . most of these firms are owned, controlled, and managed by foreigners. This places 
them in a relatively weak bargaining position in relation to the unions, which are often 
supported by governments with which these same employers must deal on many other 
issues which vitally affect their firms' profitability.8 
 
 From the point of view of the foreign firms facing very powerful unions supported by the 
government, it may be better to pay high wages. Which is worse: to accede to the demands of the 
mineworkers’ union or to endure a work stoppage, with consequent idleness of expensive capital 
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equipment? Which is worse: to pay high wages to a relative handful of workers, thereby 
achieving a reputation as a good corporate citizen, or not to pay such wages, thereby risking the 
wrath of a populist government which might nationalize the firms in the interests of “preventing 
exploitation”? In such circumstances, it may be in the companies’ profit-maximizing interests to 
agree to pay higher than market-clearing wages. 
 In political economy terms, it appears that very little is going to be done about 
institutional wage setting. In the words of Chernick: 
Clearly, any serious attempt on the part of governments to reduce the wage gap by 
imposing upper limits on negotiated wage rates will collide with the self-interest of the 
trade unions. In most CARI- COM countries [Caribbean Community, of which Jamaica is 
one], where political and trade union leadership and support are closely intertwined, it 
seems unrealistic to expect any such move within the foreseeable future. Although 
distortions in the wage structure help to produce open unemployment, governments are 
unlikely to limit the unions' freedom to bargain with the enclave industries and expose 
themselves to the considerable consequent political risks.9 
 
We conclude that the political environment in Jamaica is one where nonmarket wage 
determination is a political fact of life and will be in the years to come. The country’s 
development policies must be chosen in accordance with this constraint. We return to this issue 
below. 
 
4. Wage-Setting Institutions in Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan 
 
 The four East Asian NICs are frequently grouped together in the literature. Indeed, we 
would note certain similarities about wage-setting institutions among these four economies. 
Minimum wages exist in some of the countries, but their levels are so low as to be meaningless 
(Starr, 1981). Only in Hong Kong does trade union bargaining over wages take place free of 
Wage-Setting Institutions          13 
 
government restraint. Public employees receive wages comparable to those in the private sector, 
but not higher. Multinational corporations also follow market forces. Labor codes have not 
prevented employers from making desired labor market adjustments. Thus, at the risk of 
overgeneralizing, we would conclude that market wage determination has generally prevailed in 
the East Asian NICs. 
 In other respects, however, the labor market institutions in the East Asian NICs are 
actually quite diverse. Moreover, such diversity is not based upon size or ethnicity. Singapore 
and Korea — the least and the most populous — are committed to state intervention in the labor 
market, while Hong Kong and Taiwan allow market forces to determine labor market conditions. 
The critical point of difference within the East Asian NICs is whether supply and demand are 
generally unfettered or, alternatively, whether the State actively intervenes to influence labor 
market institutions and conditions. 
 What appears in the statutes does not necessarily reflect the actual institutions in action. 
This makes analysis more difficult. Among these four economies, Singapore has had the most 
paternalistic labor institutions. Its government is entirely open about its policy directions. Hong 
Kong is an archetypal case for laissez faire, with minimum government intervention. In Hong 
Kong as in Singapore, the official circle is quite clear about what it is practicing. In Korea, the 
labor market is supposedly operating on its own. Yet, the Korean government exercises massive 
influence over wage determination by behind-the-scenes “jawboning.” As for Taiwan, the 
economy is supposedly operating under a detailed labor code. But in practice, many provisions 
simply are not implemented, so that market forces prevail. We now present a more detailed 
examination of labor market institutions in each of the NICs. 
 
Wage-Setting Institutions          14 
 
(a) Singapore 
 
 The early labor history in the Republic of Singapore was marked by the political struggle 
of the ruling People’s Action Party against a communist union. The de-registration of the union, 
large-scale arrests of union leaders followed by long jail terms, the restriction of fringe benefits 
(Employment Act, 1963), and the outlawing of strikes (Industrial Relations Act, 1968) were the 
prices paid for labor peace (Lim and Pang, 1982). 
 Before 1972, wages in Singapore were determined by market forces. In that year, though, 
the National Wages Council (NWC) was set up with equal representation from the government, 
management, and the government-backed National Trade Union Congress (NTUC). Annual 
guidelines for wage increases have been “recommended” by this quasi-govemmental body since 
1972. The Singapore political system being what it is, what the government recommends is 
nearly always followed. Partly this is brought about by government jawboning, partly by the fact 
that 500 Singaporean companies are partly or totally owned by the government itself (Fortune, 
January 20, 1986), and partly by the fact that representatives of multinational corporations sit on 
the NWC. Both management and government seem to prefer this system to a free collective 
bargaining system. 
 The regulated labor market in Singapore has generally provided a welcome climate for 
foreign investors. Indeed, this was the motivation for regulating the labor market in the first 
place. Industrial peace has facilitated rapid economic growth. This growth, being of a labor-
intensive character, has caused the Singapore labor market to become extremely tight, with very 
low unemployment and rising real wages. Furthermore, the Central Provident Fund is a major 
source of national savings, making resources available for such social programs as government 
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housing and providing workers with substantial social security protection. These factors have 
created an acquiescent labor force in Singapore. 
 However, the very power of the central wage-setting process has itself become a source 
of instability. The National Wages Council has had substantial influence on wage levels in 
Singapore over the years. Between 1972 and 1979, the NWC pursued a policy of wage 
repression, deliberately holding wages down in order to sustain the competitiveness of labor-
intensive industries in world markets. To quote Ong Pang Boon, Labor Minister in the mid-
1970s: “Our working population may well have to undergo a period of belt-tightening all round 
... It is clear that an essential element in our new strategy must be a tighter grip on wage 
increases ... If we do not quickly and willingly change to low gear on the wages front, we shall 
further discourage investment and aggravate the unemployment problem.10 In those years, real 
wages rose by 2% while real GDP rose by 9%. The labor market tightened to the point where 
employers were obligated to compete with one another for scarce labor. Immigration quotas were 
increased to help remedy the problem of labor shortage. Still, labor was so scarce that economic 
growth was constrained. 
 In 1979, the government announced a policy of “wage correction” as part of the “Second 
Industrial Revolution.” Wages were supposed to increase by 20% per year at a time when prices 
were rising at an annual rate of 7%; but in the event, wage increases of 14% nominal (7% real) 
were brought into being. The wage correction policy was permitted to lapse in 1982; it has since 
been acknowledged to have been a mistake. 
 In 1982, the NWC endeavored to allow wage levels to be set by market forces. This 
continued until 1985. 
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 In that year, the Singapore economy faced economic recession. Real GDP declined by 
1.7%, resulting in a loss of 90,000 jobs. A complete wage freeze was put into effect. Wage 
repression remains in force at the time of this writing. As Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew has 
recently said: “Only after we have made up the ground lost in the years of negative growth in 
1985 and, I fear, also in 1986 . . . can we afford to loosen our policy of wage restraint, and then 
we must peg future increases in wages to increases in productivity.”11 
 Policy reversals like these are not going to enhance the confidence of private businesses, 
especially foreign investors. This is one serious defect of the centralized wage system. More 
subtle defects are also present. The NWC makes across-the-board wage adjustments, thus 
rigidifying the interindustry wage structure. For an economy keen on upgrading its industrial 
structure, the maintenance of fixed wage ratios across industries cannot be beneficial. 
Another important wage institution in Singapore is the Central Provident Fund (CPF). The vast 
majority of workers, including the self-employed, are included in this fund. CPF contributions 
are divided between an ordinary account, a special account, and a Medisave account and are used 
to fund old age pensions, provide health insurance, purchase residential properties, and fulfill 
other such social purposes. CPF contributions were as high as 50% of payroll in the past, paid 
equally by employees and employers. One leading observer of the Singapore labor scene has 
written: “This has given Singapore the highest national savings rate in the world (42%), [but it 
was] also a factor in the loss of competitiveness and current economic decline.”12 The 
employer’s contribution rate has been lowered from 25% to 10% in the current recession in an 
attempt by the Singapore government to invigorate employment growth. 
 Other than the NWC and the CPF, wage-setting institutions are insignificant in 
Singapore. Unions do not strike, so have little effect on wage outcomes.13 Minimum wages are 
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lacking in Singapore. Foreign firms are as well treated, if not better treated, than domestic firms 
(Deyo, 1981). There seem to be no discriminatory wage regulations against foreign firms. 
 
(b) Hong Kong 
 
 As in Singapore, the Hong Kong government provides a welfare state for its working 
class through subsidized housing, etc. But unlike Singapore, there is no Central Provident Fund 
for this purpose. 
 In terms of its labor market institutions, as in the economy as a whole, Hong Kong 
epitomizes laissez faire (Cheng, 1977; Hsia and Chau, 1978; Rabushka, 1979; Turner, 1980; 
Chow and Papanek, 1981). There is no active economic policy, nor planning. Hence, there is no 
government intervention in wage setting. Specifically, Hong Kong has no minimum wage, 
special provisions about foreign firms, or clear public sector wage advantage. The effects of the 
labor code are minimal in Hong Kong, e.g., employers need give workers only seven days’ 
notice before firing or laying off a worker, and must pay only seven days’ wages as severance 
pay. The trade union movement in Hong Kong is neither favored nor discouraged by existing 
legislation. Strikes are allowed, except by public sector unions. But because of the heavy 
dependence on export trade, labor unions even where established are wary of raising wages 
above the market- determined norm. 
 Rather than industrial conflict, the prevailing free market situation in Hong Kong is one 
of industrial labor peace. Essentially, a tight labor market has created full employment and 
rapidly rising real wages. In such circumstances, trade unions hold out little appeal, and are weak 
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as a result.14 In short, workers in Hong Kong enjoy considerable economic security under laissez 
faire. 
 In general, all is well with wage institutions in Hong Kong and little is newsworthy. 
Perhaps the highest praise is that of Lee Hsien-Lung (the son of Lee Kuan-Yew and heir 
apparent to political power in Singapore), who has held up the flexibility and resilience of the 
Hong Kong economy as a model for the economy of Singapore. This points to the strength of the 
freewheeling economy of Hong Kong, in which the flexibility of wage levels and wage structure 
play no small part. 
 
(c) Taiwan 
 
 In Taiwan, the labor market institutions are still in transition. A Labor Standards Act was 
promulgated in 1985 to replace several earlier labor laws. Martial law, which up to now has 
limited labor activity, is slated to be ended soon. To gain perspective, we review both the present 
situation and what has prevailed over the last three decades of rapid industrialization. 
 Overall, the guiding principle in Taiwan is “progress amid stability.” This slogan was 
emblazoned everywhere in the early stages of Taiwan’s industrialization and remains in force, 
though a bit less visibly, in Taiwan today. The government seeks rapid economic growth to 
pursue political stability. It is for the same goal that industrial strife is to be avoided at all cost. 
 The Labor Standards Law of 1985 was intended to regulate certain labor practices by 
requiring the vesting of pensions and providing for severance pay.15 The law has been defended 
by Mr. Po-Hsiung Wu, Minister of Interior, on several grounds, including the preservation of 
American preferential tariff treatment under GSP and the winning of the approval of the US 
Wage-Setting Institutions          19 
 
media. He also stated that “at our stage of economic development, it is not possible to continue 
the labor relations of the past.”16 
 The new legislation is intended to protect labor, but it is uneven in coverage and may 
have unintended side effects. Heavy pension requirements induce firms to fire workers near 
retirement. Firms are required to offer eight weeks of paid pregnancy leave, which is an 
inducement not to hire young females. Provisions regarding severance pay have been blamed for 
discouraging investment. The law provides that employees who were not paid wages to which 
they were entitled may ask for government arbitration, but such arbitration may be challenged in 
court. 
 Unions do very little in Taiwan. Active unionism is regarded as unwarranted, both 
because it may discourage foreign investment, and hence growth, and because it may create a 
separate power base outside the government, which might be taken over by forces aligned with 
the People’s Republic of China or with local opposition. For the same reason, employers may be 
pressured to mend their ways, if any other course might lead to labor unrest and social instability. 
Under the Union Act, any factory hiring 30 or more adult workers must be unionized (Articles 4 
and 6) except in the munitions industry and government employees. Strikes are outlawed under 
Article 39 of the martial law. Unions are underfinanced. The Provincial General Labor Union 
(Taiwan’s equivalent of America’s AFL-CIO) does not have enough funds to hire more than six 
full-time staffers. Union representatives are heavily outnumbered in the legislature compared to 
representatives of capitalists. 
 Taiwan has a formal minimum wage law, but its level is well below the market wage rate. 
In 1985, the GNP per capita was US $3,000 (hence approximately $12,000 for the average 
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family of four) but the minimum wage for a worker was less than US $2,000. In fact, in public 
debate or government policy pronouncements, the minimum wage rate is essentially ignored. 
 Public sector pay policy has no appreciable wage-raising influence in Taiwan. The 
government sector pays no more than the private sector and often less. 
 Firms with foreign investment must be approved case by case when they are established. 
But once approved, they are not treated any differently from local firms. All the same, any firm 
may be pressured by the government to satisfy workers’ demands if public order is threatened. 
For example, when DuPont laid off workers in 1985, it was required to pay twice as much 
severance pay as the law stated. 
 There is so far no unemployment insurance in Taiwan. Health, injury, and pension plans 
are paid jointly (employer, 80%; employee, 20%). 
 
(d) Korea 
 
 In Korean labor markets, supply and demand reign. A number of analysts — Moran 
(1976), Lindauer (1984), Fields (1985), Richardson and Kim (1985), Castaneda and Park (1986) 
and others — have commented favorably on the efficiency of the Korean labor market, the 
responsiveness of Korean workers to job opportunities in other locations and other sectors, and 
the absence of wage distortions owing to trade unions, public sector pay policy, or minimum 
wages. 
 Labor unions in Korea are very weak. About 15% of workers in Korea are members of 
unions — the same as in the United States. However, the powers of unions are severely limited. 
Workers may form unions but firms are not obligated to conduct bona fide collective bargaining 
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with them. If bargaining does take place, it must be only at the local level; national unions or the 
nationwide Federation of Korean Trade Unions may not intervene in collective bargaining on 
behalf of a local union. In the event of a labor dispute, the law specifies a cooling-off period of 
30 days in the case of private sector labor disputes, 40 days in the case of public sector disputes. 
Arbitration is compulsory. 
 In 1972, the right to strike was revoked. By the end of the decade, workers took to the 
streets, rioting against their own union leaders, in the belief that they “were often in collusion 
with either management or government agencies.”17 One of the first actions of President Chun’s 
regime was to pass a new labor law in 1980, establishing company unions subject to the 
conditions outlined in the previous paragraph. In 1981, the right to strike was reinstated but in a 
very limited way. The government could intervene in any dispute that threatened to develop into 
a major job action. In practice, this has meant that the police are sent in after a day or two, and 
the union leaders are arrested and jailed for up to five years. Thus, the “right” to strike is not 
much of a right in practice. 
 Other forces that may push wages up above market-clearing levels are essentially absent 
in Korea. Public and private pay scales are quite similar to one another. Furthermore, the 
percentage of pay raise for civil service employees carries great force of persuasion among 
workers in the private sector. In this way, government endeavors to regulate wage growth in the 
economy. Foreign firms are not treated differently under the law so far as employment is 
concerned. However, when one Japanese bank had labor trouble due to alleged discriminatory 
personnel policies, workers’ protest was not prevented by government security forces, as it 
would have been if Korean firms had been involved. Korea’s protective labor legislation, 
applicable only to larger firms, is not a significant impediment to worker mobility. 
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 It is generally thought that wages in Korea have been repressed, at least since 1981. But 
unlike Singapore, where wage repression was announced openly by the government and 
instituted by the National Wage Council, wage repression in Korea is far from open: 
Acting through the Bankers’ Association of Korea, the government also tried to keep 
wage increases low by having banks restrict credit for firms which increased wages 
beyond government guidelines. This move in late 1980, however, faced strong resistance 
from the Federation of Korean Trade Unions. Whenever there was a more explicit 
confrontation over this issue, the government would say ‘There is no official guideline. It 
is just a suggestion on the part of the government.’18 
 
But considering the heavy involvement of government in the Korean economy and in the society, 
“suggestions” carry a great deal of force. Government’s efforts at jawboning lower wages are 
viewed by many labor economists in Korea (e.g., Bai, 1985) as having led to “wage repression.” 
 Wage repression, if effective, would ordinarily be expected to lead to shortages of labor 
relative to the available supply at the artificially low wage. But by holding down wages 
throughout their economies, the authorities in Singapore and Korea formed a kind of cartel, to 
which the standard theory of labor market monopsony (e.g., Ehrenberg and Smith, 1988, p. 72) 
would apply. Firms hire up to the point where marginal labor cost equals marginal revenue 
product, but then pay a low wage which reduces quantity of labor supplied and clears the market. 
The labor shortage, though concealed, nonetheless restricts production and growth. 
 As 1986 drew to an end, Korea had no minimum wage. However, one year earlier, the 
government had announced a plan to institute a minimum wage in the near future. A planning 
committee was formed in conjunction with the Sixth Socioeconomic Plan to work out a proposed 
scheme. The idea on the table was to establish regional minimum wage boards, consisting of 
equal numbers of representatives of management, labor, and the public interest. These boards 
would recommend minimum wages for specific occupations and industries in their jurisdictions. 
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Initially, the minimum wage would apply to eight low-paying manufacturing industries — 
textiles, footwear, etc. — and would later be extended more widely. 
 The Korean authorities are well aware of the serious risks minimum wages pose. They 
worry about adverse effects on employment and international competitiveness. Yet, they feel a 
minimum wage is necessary at this point, partly because a social consensus now seems to have 
been reached that certain groups of workers are paid unacceptably low wages, partly because 
these workers and their sympathizers have taken to the streets in support of minimum wages, and 
partly because the US Trade Representative would be mollified in Korea could show that its 
exports to US markets were not produced by ‘‘sweated” labor (and thus protective measures in 
the United States would be averted). It appears that whatever the minimum wage is that will 
finally be enacted in Korea, it will probably be restricted to workers in large firms in a small 
number of industries and its level will be set to avoid serious disemployment effects. It is not 
likely, therefore, that the forthcoming minimum wage in Korea will significantly affect the 
market wage determination process. 
 
5. Wages and Economic Growth 
 
 Wage policy in the East Asian economies proceeded in two stages. At first, premature 
wage increases were to be avoided; this would permit economic growth to increase employment. 
Then, in this second stage, once full employment was attained, the heightened competition for 
workers would lead employers to bid up wages. 
 As shown by the figures in Table 1, this indeed happened. Unemployment rates have 
been of the order of 1-4%. The mix of employment shifted in favor of better paying categories. 
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Real wages rose, often at the same rate as GNP. Income inequality in the East Asian NICs is low 
to moderate by world standards. Absolute poverty fell as economic growth took place. 
 As wages rose, policies were introduced aimed at economizing on the use of increasingly 
scarce labor and enhancing labor productivity through investments in complementary physical 
and human capital. But sustained economic growth brought with it continued high demand for 
labor, resulting in further wage increases. 
 The effect on standards of living is described graphically by Lim for the case of 
Singapore: 
In both the NICs and the non-NICs, the absolute standard of living made possible by an 
export factory worker’s wage is also fairly high ... the average wage of a female 
electronics worker in Singapore puts her family in an income bracket where 96% of the 
households have a refrigerator and television, 45% have a washing-machine, 25% a 
video-cassette recorder, etc.19 
 
Would that the workers in other countries could live so well! 
 Export-led growth contributed to the East Asian economies’ successful development. So 
too did market wage determination. 
 As other countries plan their development strategies in light of the successful experiences 
of the East Asian NICs, an important point should be kept in mind. Whether an export-oriented 
trade strategy is better or worse than an inward- oriented strategy may well depend on a 
country’s choice of wage policy. Consider the case of active export promotion through subsidies, 
infrastructure provision, or other external benefits to the export sector. Suppose that in these 
circumstances, an export-promoting country permits premature wage increases to be granted, and 
suppose further that because labor costs often constitute the largest share of total cost of a 
product, that the country’s exports become unprofitable in world markets. The revenues earned 
by private companies may fail to equal the social costs of exporting. In this case, an export-
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oriented development strategy subsidized by the government may cause the country to lose 
money. Export promotion would be a costly misuse of resources in such a circumstance — a 
lesson which potential exporters, and those who advise them, should be careful to heed. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
 We have compared wage-setting institutions in the economies of Hong Kong, Korea, 
Singapore, and Taiwan with those in Costa Rica, Panama, and Jamaica. Those institutions which 
raise wages appreciably above market-clearing levels in key sectors in many developing 
economies — minimum wages, trade unions, government pay policy, pay policies of 
multinational corporations, and labor codes — have had little role to play in the East Asian NICs. 
 Although the NICs have generally relied on market wage determination, they have done 
so with very different amounts of government involvement. The governments of Singapore and 
Korea have been the most interventionist, applying government power to restrict wage growth. 
The Hong Kong government has adopted perhaps the most laissez faire set of labor market 
policies of any government in the world. Taiwan is closer in that respect to Hong Kong than to 
Korea or Singapore. The difference, interestingly, is not between the larger economies and the 
city-states but between the overall amount of central direction in their respective economies. But 
when confronted by labor unrest and entrepreneurial flight respectively, the governments of 
Korea and Singapore were forced to subordinate their iron will to economic inevitability. Thus, 
when wide departures from the market wage rate threatened to slow the engine of growth, they 
reversed their courses and turned again to market forces. 
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 Whereas avoidance of premature wage increases dominated wage policy in the NICs in 
the past, conscious efforts are now being made to push wages up somewhat. As we have 
described, Taiwan introduced a new labor law in 1985 and Korea is actively considering 
introducing a minimum wage. Whether market determination will prevail in the East Asian NICs 
in the future as it has in the past remains to be seen. We predict that it will. The NICs’ 
governments are well aware that market wage determination has served them very well up to 
now. This awareness is perhaps the strongest reason to predict that they will not seriously distort 
wages in the future. 
 
Insert Table 1 Here 
 
 
 The fact is that the East Asian NICs have done better than economies elsewhere. The 
NICs have attained full employment, pronounced improvements in real wages, and rapidly rising 
prosperity. They have done so while letting supply and demand dominate their labor markets. 
We draw the following conclusions from the record: 
(1) A market-determined wage rate, combined with an export-oriented economy, can absorb 
large numbers of workers in a few short years. By contrast, high minimum wages, 
militant unionism, or overzealous social legislation appear to impede growth of 
employment and output and hence do little to help country-wide poverty. 
(2) Wage repression is unnecessary and undesirable at this stage — unnecessary because, as 
in the experience of Hong Kong, full employment can be attained quickly; undesirable 
because, as in the experience of Korea, wage repression generates workers’ resentment 
and endangers industrial peace. 
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(3) What justifies initial wage restraint is the rapid rise in labor earnings that accompanied 
the East Asian NICs’ economic growth. Real earnings grew much more rapidly in Hong 
Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan than in Latin America, both because full 
employment was attained and because real wages per hour are sharply higher. As a result, 
the workers in the East Asian NICs live very much better than they did a decade or two 
ago. 
 The successes of market wage determination point to a direction that other countries 
might pursue to advantage. But this call should not be misinterpreted. The goal of any economic 
system is to provide higher standards of living for people. Living standards should not be 
sacrificed to economic growth per se. Nor is laissez faire capitalism necessarily the best form of 
economic organization. What we would highlight is that when supply and demand have 
determined wages and when economic growth consistent with comparative advantage has taken 
place, outcomes have been favorable at both the macro and the micro levels. Standards of living 
have jumped as a result. 
 Looking ahead, more work needs to be done analyzing both theoretically and empirically 
the interactions between countries’ labor market policies and their development strategies. For a 
start on theoretical work along these lines, see Fields (1989). 
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Notes 
 
1. Throughout this article, the term “Korea” is used to refer to the Republic of Korea. 
2. For further reading on these institutions in Latin America and their political antecedents, 
see Deyo (1986). 
3. Says Gregory (1981, p. 400): “The omission of trade unions from considerations as a 
significant force stems from the wide consensus I found in Costa Rica that they are not 
particularly powerful and do not represent a significant independent influence on wage 
levels except perhaps in some of the semiautonomous public corporations.” 
4. See, for instance, PREALC (1979). 
5. Following the use of the term “social security” (“seguridad social") throughout Latin 
America, we are using that term here to refer in general to economic security programs 
and not just in reference to government-provided old age pensions, as in American 
English. 
6. Spinanger (1985), p. 65. For further analyses of wages and employment in Panama, see 
Morley (1984) and Sjaastad (1985). 
7. Tidrick (1975), pp. 308-309. 
8. Chernick (1978), p. 86. 
9. Chernick (1978), p. 86. 
10. The Straits Times, February 29, 1976. 
11. Asian Wall Street Journal, June 24, 1986. 
12. Lim (1986), p. 13. 
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13. Lim and Pang (1982, p. 116) refer to this as the “progressive pacification of the 
Singapore labour movement,” noting that only one work stoppage was reported in 1977 
and none since then. 
14. Throughout the world, trade unions are strongest when labor markets are slackest. 
15. Vested pensions are those which must be paid even if the worker leaves the firm 
voluntarily or is laid off. 
16. Interview in Commonwealth, January 31, 1986). 
17. Wickman (1982), pp. 123-124. 
18. Nam (1984), pp. 73-74. 
19. Lim (forthcoming), p. 10. 
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